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Nonfeasance and the Duty to Assist:
The American Seinfeld* Syndrome
Introduction
The Tragic Death of Sherrice Iverson
Even in the middle of the night, the flashing lights of the Las
Vegas casinos shine as brightly as ever. Inside, serious gamblers
hardly notice the hour. The game is everything.
Leroy Iverson liked the slot machines. And though his
daughter, Sherrice, was only 7, he would often bring her along.
She would play while he gambled into the wee hours.
On Memorial Day weekend [1997], Iverson brought Sherrice to
the Primadonna Casino, and once again, she was left on her
own. Security cameras captured Sherrice playing what appeared
to be a game of hide-and-seek with a stranger, a young man. No
one knew it yet, but this was her last hour alive.
At 3:48 a.m., Sherrice is seen darting into the women's
bathroom. Seconds later, the young man she'd been playing
with follows. Just after 5:00 in the morning, Sherrice's body was
discovered, half-naked, on a toilet seat. She had been sexually
molested and strangled to death.
Sherrice Iverson's death three years ago sparked a national
debate, triggered partly because of the youth of her killer, eighteen-
year-old high school senior Jeremy Strohmeyer.2  Although
Jeremy's acts were particularly abhorrent, he will receive a fitting
* Readers may remember the final episode of the popular comedy, Seinfeld,
wherein the lead characters were prosecuted for failing to assist a pedestrian who
was being mugged. Seinfeld (NBC television broadcast, May 14, 1998). Seinfeld's
swan song is a quintessential example of a failure to assist case. See id.
1. 20/20 (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 30, 1998).
2. See id.
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punishment for his acts of violence-on October 14, 1998, he was
sentenced to life imprisonment as part of a plea agreement.
The outcry attracting more media attention, however, was not
about the confessed teenage killer who strangled a seven-year-old
in a casino bathroom. The newspaper columnists and the public at
large instead preferred to vilify another teenager; one who stood on
the toilet seat in the next stall, watched the brutality over a
partition, and did nothing to stop it. 4 David Cash, an eighteen-year-
old friend of Strohmeyer's, did exactly that; nevertheless he will
escape any punishment for his actions that many call deplorable
To add insult to injury, he also expected to profit from a movie deal
and a lawsuit against former high school officials who barred him
from graduation ceremonies following the murder.6 "I'm no idiot.
I'll (expletive) get my money out of this,"... "I figure I'll probably
get a couple million off that," Cash said in an interview with the
Long Beach, California Press-Telegram'
Cash's actions in failing to assist the dying seven-year-old are
arguably of the most reprehensible character.8 Yet, Cash's irre-
sponsible behavior was not confined to that casino bathroom,
because he went on to denigrate the memory of little Sherrice in
radio interviews.9 "It's a very tragic event, OK, but the simple fact
remains I do not know this little girl," Cash said on the air.10 "I do
not know starving children in Panama. I do not know people that
die of disease in Egypt. The only person I knew in this event was
Jeremy Strohmeyer, and I know as his best friend that he had
potential.""
The only question that remains in this contemptible tale is
whether Cash should now be held legally responsible for his
"bastardly" actions." Across the country, letters in opinion
columns, editorials in newspapers, and magazine articles have
3. See id.
4. See, e.g., Martin Dyckman, Standing By Can Be A Crime, ST. PETERSBURG




8. See Robert Selna, Protesters Demand Berkeley Expulsion; UC Student
Assailed For Alleged Role in Girl's Slaying, Special to the Examiner, S.F.
EXAMINER, Aug. 27, 1998, at A20 (demanding that Cash be expelled for "morally
reprehensible behavior.")
9. See Dyckman, supra note 4.
10. Selna, supra note 8, at A20.
11. Id.
12. See Dyckman, supra note 4.
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called for David Cash to be formally prosecuted for his behavior."
Because of the absence of a civil or criminal common law duty to
assist, however, it is virtually impossible for Cash to be held liable
for failing to help Sherrice Iverson.'4 His actions are not only
ignored by the American justice system, but have been functionally
condoned by courts under the common law system of liability."
Even if the court system will allow such behavior to escape
punishment, several state legislatures may soon independently
decide the issue of duty to assist cases in the criminal context.' 6
Several states, such as Massachusetts, Ohio, Rhode Island, and
Vermont, already have criminal statutes that offer some such
protection to victims like Sherrice Iverson and others. 7 In the wake
of this little child's death, California, Nevada, New Jersey, and
Michigan are attempting to follow suit as similar bills have been
introduced in each of those states. 8
Many European nations have had such legislation established
for years, but lawmakers in the United States have not been as
quick to enact laws imposing an affirmative duty to act upon
witnesses of crimes or accidents. 9 But in response to Sherrice's
death, not only are state legislators confronting the problem of how
to punish people like David Cash, but the Federal government is as
well.' In September 1997, Senator Barbara Boxer and Texas
Representative Nick Lampson introduced the Sherrice Iverson Act,
which would make states ineligible for federal child-abuse
prevention funds under the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
13. See Associated Press, Iverson Slaying Prompts "Good Samaritan" Bill, LAS
VEGAS REV. J., Sept. 30, 1998, at 3B; see also Tribune News Services, "Good
Samaritan" Law Sought, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 16, 1998 at 3; Donrey Capital Bureau,
Bill Would Make Cash's Silence Illegal, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Aug. 27, 1998, at 4A.
14. See John T. Pardun, Comment, Good Samaritan Laws: A Global
Perspective, 20 LoY. L.A. INT'L. & COMP. L.J. 591 (1998), for a discussion of the
general lack of a duty to assist in American jurisprudence.
15. See id.
16. See Associated Press, "Good Samaritan" Bill Linked to Girl's Murder -
Barbara Boxer and A Texas Congressman Introduce the Sherrice Iverson Act,
FRESNO BEE, Sept. 10, 1998, at B6; see also supra note 14 and accompanying text.
17. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268, § 40 (West 1984); OHIO REV. CODE.
ANN. § 2921.23 (Anderson 1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-56-1 (1956); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12 § 519 (1984).
18. See Girl's Murder Prompts California to Consider 'Good Samaritan' Laws,
DESERET NEWS, Dec. 10, 1998 at A22; Stacy Finz, Killing of Girl, 7, in Casino
Spurs Good Samaritan Bills, S.F. CHRONICLE, Dec. 9, 1998 at A21; Tribune News
Service, supra note 13, at 3.
19. See Pardun, supra note 14, at 596-97.
20. See Associated Press, supra note 16, at B6.
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Act if they failed to enact laws requiring third party witnesses to
report sexual crimes against children.2'
Bills such as these may represent a drastic change in American
victims' rights jurisprudence. If passed, they could symbolize a step
toward holding witnesses of such crimes responsible for failing to
do something as simple as picking up a telephone and calling the
police. This Comment will examine the traditional view of
American courts and their reluctance to impose liability on
bystanders who fail to assist at accident or crime scenes. Part I
examines the current state of the law, including the general absence
of a duty to assist and how that absence is interpreted in both civil
and criminal law. Specifically, it discusses the reasoning in civil
cases that withholding assistance is not actionable, either because
no duty to assist exists, or because the defendant did not commit an
"action." Part II analyzes the inherent inconsistencies in the
current state of the law. It also compares the concept of disallowing
recovery in duty to assist cases with the generally applied
reasonably prudent person duty. Part III advocates a change in the
existing law to provide for a reasonableness analysis in duty to
assist cases. This Comment argues that allowing a jury to
determine liability in cases of nonfeasance, based upon an objective
reasonableness standard, provides a more consistent approach to
the question of liability than does the current state of the law.
Part I
A. The General Rule of Nonfeasance
In both civil and criminal law, the failure of uninvolved
bystanders to assist at accident or crime scenes is completely
nonactionable, even if harm is forseeable.22 The concept of "failing
to act," often called nonfeasance, has been part of American law
for hundreds of years, and the resulting nonliability remains
virtually unchallenged even today.' However, although both civil
21. See S.2452, 105th Cong., § 2 (1997).
22. See Jackson v. Forest City Enter., Inc., 675 N.E.2d 1356, 1358 (Ohio 1996)
("Ordinarily, an individual possesses no duty to act affirmatively for the protection
of others and the fact that harm to another is foreseeable as a result of a failure to
act does not create a duty to prevent harm.").
23. See James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97 (1908)
(discussing the common law position on the Good Samaritan rule). Although
Black's Law Dictionary defines nonfeasance as "the failure to act when a duty to
act existed," most modern courts equate the term with scenarios wherein recovery
is denied. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 440 (Pocket ed. 1996). Cf. Lewis v.
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and criminal law are well settled on the lack of a duty to assist,
different courts discuss the doctrine and deny liability using very
different language.
Most victims, who would be plaintiffs in duty to assist cases if
they were actionable, would characterize the defendants' negligent
action as the "failure to do what ought to be done;"24 this
characterization allows ample room for courts to deny liability. In
this realm, courts typically make decisions disallowing recovery
upon one of two different bases; one, that the defendant's duty to
assist the plaintiff was a moral duty, but not a legal one, and two,
that any legal duty the defendant may have had did not encompass
affirmative action. 5 In other words, courts usually analyze that the
failure to assist did not constitute an affirmative act harming the
plaintiff, or that the defendant was not legally bound to act.26 More
often than not, albeit, courts discuss the duty owed in the context of
morality, in determining that even if a defendant "ought" to act, he
is not legally required to do so.27
When American courts do hold persons liable for negligent or
criminal acts, they most often explicitly determine that the
defendant breached a specific duty that he owed to another
person 8 In imposing liability, the courts must determine that 1)
the defendant had a duty, and 2) he breached that duty with an
overt act.2' This test is conjunctive; thus, if the court determines
either that the defendant had no duty, or that he did not act,
liability is not imposed.0
Razzberries, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 437,441 (I11. App. 1 Dist. 1991) ("Liability arises from
misfeasance, but not from nonfeasance."); see also infra note 27 and accompanying
text.
24. Cameron v. Ohio Dep't of Transp. 669 N.E.2d 874, 877 (Ohio 1995).
25. See Jackson, 675 N.E.2d at 1358.
26. See id.; see also Melodee Lane Lingerie Co. v. American District
Telegraph Co., 218 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1966), for a discussion of the
nonfeasance/misfeasance distinction and the importance of the distinction between
action and inaction in determining liability. See infra Part I(A)(2), The
"Action/Inaction" Analysis, for a discussion of the action/inaction distinction.
27. See Jackson, 675 N.E.2d at 1358.
28. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§§ 29-30 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988) for a discussion of the prima facie case of
negligence. As the authors indicate, a plaintiff seeking to prove negligence must
establish: (1) that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant
breached that duty; (3) that the defendant's negligence was an actual and
proximate cause of the plaintiff's harm; and (4) the plaintiff suffered actual
damages. See id. For the purposes of nonfeasance, only the first three prongs are
of any significance. See infra Part I(A)(1) for a discussion of breach. See infra
Parts I(C) and II(B)(2) for a discussion of causation.
29. See KEETON ET. AL., supra note 28, §§ 29-30.
30. See id.
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1. The Duty Analysis-The American system of justice
imposes various duties upon people-the duties to care for our
children,3 to maintain integrity in our professions,32 and to be
honest when testifying in court are but a few.3 3 In addition to these
specific duties, which are sometimes imposed by civil or criminal
law, there is the time-honored "catch-all" of the duty to act as a
"reasonably prudent person. 3 4 As the basis of tort law, the duty to
act reasonably is nearly absolute; when that duty is neglected, a
person can be held liable for any resulting harm.35
In both criminal and civil law, courts often determine that the
duty owed to a crime or an accident victim by the public at large
does not encompass affirmative acts.36 For example, in People v.
Beardsley, the defendant had been convicted of manslaughter in the
death of his companion, Blanche Burns.37  The two had been
drinking together during the night, and Ms. Burns had also been
taking morphine.38 The combination of the substances led to Ms.
Burns' death early the next morning.39 The defendant, having been
intoxicated, asked a friend to look after Ms. Burns but did nothing
else to assist her once her physical condition began to decline.40
The trial court in Beardsley had originally determined that the
defendant had a legal duty to assist Ms. Burns, the violation of
31. See Florio v. Texas, 784 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. 1990). Florio discusses the
general duty parents have to care for children in the context of a criminal
prosecution of a live-in boyfriend who failed to assist a child. See id. Interestingly,
the Florio court ruled that the boyfriend had no duty to the child, even though he
was described as a "babysitter" and "caretaker." See id. at 417.
32. See State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Murrel, 74 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1954) (discussing
duties owed by attorneys to clients); Sugarman v. Bd. of Registration in Med., 662
N.E.2d 1020 (Mass. 1996) (discussing duties owed by psychiatrists to maintain
integrity in the profession); Golde v. Fox, 159 Cal. Rptr. 864 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1979) (discussing the duties real estate brokers have to maintain integrity in their
profession).
33. See Dalbey Bros. Lumber Co. v. Crispin, 12 N.W.2d 277, 279 (Iowa 1943)
(discussing the purpose of oaths to secure the truth in court).
34. See Drum v. Miller, 47 S.E. 421 (N.C. 1904). Drum recites the proposition
that forseeable injury of any kind, and not the specific injury that was sustained, is
sufficient for purposes of tort liability. See id. "[W]hen the act is lawful, the
liability depends, not upon the particular consequence or result that may flow from
it, but upon the ability of a prudent man, in the exercise of ordinary care, to
foresee that injury or damage will naturally or probably be the result of his act."
Id. at 423.
35. See id.
36. See infra Part I(A)(1).
37. 113 N.W. 1128 (Mich. 1907).
38. See id. at 1129.
39. See id.
40. See id.
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41which was a crime. On appeal, the appellate court also discussed
the importance of a legal duty, but took great pains to distinguish
Beardsley's legal duty from any moral obligation.42 First, the
appellate court emphasized the importance of moral duties, quoting
United States v. Knowles:
43
[1]t is undoubtedly the moral duty of every person to extend to
others assistance when in danger,.. and if such efforts should be
omitted by any one when they could be made without imperiling
his own life, he would, by his conduct, draw upon himself the
just censure and reproach of good men; but this is the only
punishment to which he would be subjected by society."
Relying upon the difference between law and morality in its
decision, the court noted, "we must eliminate from the case all
consideration of mere moral obligation, and discover whether
respondent was under a legal duty towards Blanche Burns at the
time of her death.. . .. ,4 The court ruled that Mr. Beardsley had not
voluntarily undertaken any legal duty to Ms. Burns through his
prior relationship to her, and thus could not be found guilty.
46
In overturning Beardsley's conviction, the court specifically
explained that "[t]he law recognizes that under some circumstances
the omission of a duty owed by one individual to another, where
such omission results in the death of the one to whom the duty is
owing, will make the other chargeable with manslaughter., 47 "This
rule of law is always based upon the proposition that the duty
neglected must be a legal duty, and not a mere moral obligation.,
48
This discussion of duty in Beardsley mirrors the application of
duty in civil law, and exemplifies the similarities between civil and
criminal nonfeasance even as to the distinction between moral and
legal liability. On the civil side, in Yania v. Bigan, the widow of a
miner brought a suit arising out of a failure to assist scenario 49 The
decedent and the defendant had been business associates; during
the course of a visit to the defendant's property, the defendant had
asked the decedent to help him start a water pump in one of his
41. See id. at 1131.
42. See Beardsley, 113 N.W. at 1131.
43. See United States v. Knowles, 26 F. Cas. 800, 801 (D. Ct. N. Cal. 1864)
(Nov. 15,540); see also Beardsley, 113 N.W. at 1131.
44. See Beardsley, 113 N.W. at 1131.
45. Seeid. at 1131.
46. See id.
47. Id. at 1129.
48. Id. at 1129.
49. 155 A.2d 343, 344 (Pa. 1959).
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trenches."0  The decedent jumped into the trench and was
drowned. 1 His widow instituted a wrongful death suit, alleging that
the defendant failed both to warn her husband about the danger of
the trench, and that he failed to help him back out of the hole. 2
The trial court sustained demurrers to the complaint, because
of the failure to state a claim.53 On appeal, the state's Supreme
Court affirmed the decision, holding that the defendant had no duty
to rescue the decedent, nor any duty to warn him of potential
danger.54 The court stated, "The mere fact that Bigan saw Yania in
a position of peril in the water imposed upon him no legal, although
a moral, obligation or duty to go to his rescue unless Bigan was
legally responsible, in whole or in part, for placing Yania in the
perilous position."55 The Yania court held that the complaint did
not "aver any facts which impose upon Bigan legal responsibility
for placing Yania in the dangerous position in the water, and absent
such legal responsibility, the law imposes upon Bigan no duty of
rescue."
56
2. The Action-Inaction Analysis- Contrarily, other courts
deciding nonfeasance cases focus upon the defendant's conduct
rather than upon any specific duty involved. 7 Typically, the failure
to assist is labeled an "omission," and not as an "action."58  In
explaining the difference, the Supreme Court of Tennessee has
stated in Bradshaw v. Daniel:
In determining the existence of a duty, courts have distinguished
between action and inaction. Professor Prosser has commented
that "the reason for the distinction may be said to lie in the fact
that by 'misfeasance' the defendant has created a new risk of
harm to the plaintiff, while by 'nonfeasance' he has at least
made his situation no worse, and has merely failed to benefit






54. See Yania, 155 A.2d at 345-46.
55. Id. at 346.
56. Id.
57. See supra Part I(A); see also supra note 23 and accompanying text. For the
purposes of this comment, discussion will be limited to an examination of action
and duty. See id.
58. See generally Melodee Lane Lingerie Co. v. American District Telegraph
Co., 218 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1966).
59. See Bradshaw v. Daniel, 854 S.W.2d 865, 870 (Tenn. 1983) (quoting
KEETON ET AL., supra note 28, at § 56).
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Crime and accident bystanders are not legally bound to act
affirmatively; therefore, a jury does not determine the issue of
reasonableness in cases of omission since someone cannot 'inact
unreasonably.' 60 Through this reasoning, a person can fail to assist
an assault victim without incurring liability even if a jury could find
his conduct unreasonable. Courts often draw this distinction again
presupposing that the obligation to assist is a moral one; yet, they
decline to require assistance legally.62
For the purposes of duty to assist cases, there is sometimes no
clear line between an "action" and an "omission." 63 In criminal law,
the "actus reus," or the external part of the crime, provides a
definition of "action." '  Contrary to caselaw definitions of non-
feasance, however, many criminal codes define the actus reus as
conduct which "includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform
an act of which he is physically capable." 65 This is different from
Beardsley and other cases which distinguish acts from omissions
and thus perpetuates the difficulty in defining the "action" for the
purpose of nonfeasance. 66
References to omissions in the criminal context, however, are
frequently interpreted as requiring punishment for behavior under
60. See id. The logical argument in this context is that reasonableness can only
be confined to action, and that inaction cannot be viewed as unreasonable because
it is a nullity; effectually, inaction does not exist and therefore cannot be
unreasonable.
61. See id.; see also Hughes v. State, 719 S.W.2d 560, 565 (Tex. Crim. App.
1986) (Teague, J., concurring). In Justice Teague's concurring opinion, subtitled
"A Requiem Dedicated to the Kitty Genoveses of this Country," he discussed the
famous saga of Ms. Genovese, who was murdered outside her apartment in
Queens, New York, in 1964. Id. Thirty-eight people in her apartment building
heard her screams, but did nothing to assist her. See id. Teague asks the question,
"Why did those good persons not come forth to aid Kitty, a fellow human being,
who was then being mauled by nothing less than a rabies-infected animal, who was
then disguised as a human being?... [I]t was their fear of legal consequences, and
not necessarily their timidity or lack of bravery, that chilled their better instincts to
intervene on behalf of Kitty!!! Do we want such thinking to exist in Texas? I, for
one, do not." Id.
62. See, e.g., People v. Beardsley, 113 N.W. 1128, 1131 (Mich. 1907); see also
supra Part I(A)(1).
63. See infra Part I(A)(2).
64. See Albin Eser, The Principle of "Harm" in the Concept of Crime: A
Comparative Analysis of the Criminally Protected Legal Interests, 4 DUQ. L. REV.
345, 386 (1965). ("[Ajctus reus is to be interpreted as the comprehensive notion of
act, harm, and its connecting link, causation, with actus expressing the voluntary
physical movement in the sense of conduct and reus expressing the fact that this
conduct results in a certain proscribed harm....") (emphasis in original).
65. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1) (1984)(emphasis added).
66. See Beardsley, 113 N.W. at 1131.
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the defendant's control and not for uncontrollable behavior.67 For
example, in Martin v. State, the defendant had been found
intoxicated on a public highway, in violation of a clearly drafted
"public drunkenness" statute;' yet, his conviction was overturned
because he had been dragged to that highway from his home by
police officers.69 Because he had been forced into the public area,
the court determined that there had been no voluntary act on his
part, and no actus reus.7°
Criminal cases also discuss the "action" as being an "exercise
of the will."71 In State v. Utter, the defendant was charged with
second degree murder in the stabbing death of his son.72 At trial,
Utter offered expert psychiatric testimony that his jungle training
and experiences in World War II contributed to a "conditioned
response" which caused him to kill his son involuntarily.73 In
upholding his conviction for the lesser included offense of
manslaughter, the court noted that the defense of "conditioned
response" is viable, because it can cause someone to kill without
knowledge or will, and without any "voluntary act" on the
defendant's behalf.
74
Thus, the courts in Utter and Martin discuss the "action" in
terms of control; Martin could not control his actions because of
outside force, and Utter could not control his actions because of a
mental disorder. 5 In still other criminal cases, defendants can
escape liability based on the lack of an actus reus even though the
conduct in question was a voluntary act.76 In Barber v. Superior
Court, a defendant doctor was charged with murder after removing
feeding tubes from a brain-dead patient. The court dismissed the
charges, stating "[w]e view petitioner's conduct as that of an




71. See State v. Utter, 479 P.2d 946 (Wash. App. 1971); see also infra Part
I(B)(2).
72. See Utter, 479 P.2d at 948-51.
73. See id. at 947.
74. See id. at 951. This defense has been followed in Washington since Utter.
See State v. Perkins, 14 Wash. App. 27, 31, 538 P.2d 829, 833 (1975) ("This
jurisdiction has recognized that a true conditioned response evoked by external
stimuli may produce acts which completely exculpate the actor because he lacked
any criminal intent.").
75. See generally Martin v. State, 17 So. 2d 427 (Ala. Ct. App. 1944); Utter, 479
P.2d at 948-50.
76. See Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Cal. App. 1983); see also
infra Part I(B)(2).
77. See Barber, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
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omission rather than that of an affirmative action. ,,78
Specifically, the court held that the withdrawal of the tubes was
tantamount to withholding medication or nourishment, and not
commensurate to actively killing the patient.79
American civil law also relies on the distinction between active
and passive conduct to define "action" for the purposes of
nonfeasance cases.' In Logarta v. Gustafson the parents of a
suicide victim sued his companion for wrongful death.8" The
defendant claimed his actions were passive, rather than active, and
therefore not actionable at common law.82  The court noted, in
dismissing the claim:
[u]nder English common law, this distinction was referred to as
the difference between "misfeasance" and "nonfeasance":
There is no distinction more deeply rooted in the common law
and more fundamental than that between misfeasance and
nonfeasance, between active misconduct working positive injury
to others and passive inaction, a failure to take positive steps to
benefit others, or to protect them from harm not created by any
wrongful act of the defendant. This distinction is founded on
that attitude of extreme individualism so typical of anglo-saxon
legal thought.83
Consequently, civil courts have been able to deny liability on
the basis that the defendants' conduct was a passive, rather than
active, gesticulation." Although this distinction is frequently
applied, it is difficult to use and can be applied inaccurately. For
example, in Moore v. Murphy, a sheriff failed to continue holding a
ladder for an inmate who was painting a wall.85 The inmate fell
from the ladder sustaining personal injury." The court neither
discussed nor imposed an affirmative duty upon the sheriff to act;
rather, the court found that the sheriff's failure to keep holding the
ladder was in fact an "action" and not an "omission," and the
sheriff was liable for misfeasance, the commission of an overt act.87
78. See id at 490.
79. See id.
80. See Logarta v. Gustafson, 998 F. Supp. 998 (E.D. Wis. 1998).
81. See id.
82. See id. The defendant had seen the decedent in a field, with a gun in hand,
and knew at the time that he was despondent. See id. at 1000. The defendant then
left, asking that the decedent "only think about what he was doing." See id.
83. See id. at 1001.
84. See Moore v. Murphy, 119 N.W.2d 759, 760 (Iowa 1963).





Nevertheless, if the court had characterized the incident as not
involving action on the part of the sheriff, he could not have been
held liable for negligence under their rationale.
The result in Moore is analogous to an English case decided
near the turn of the century, Newton v. Ellis.88 There, the plaintiff
was driving his carriage at night along a highway. 89 The defendant
had excavated a hole in the highway without lighting the
surrounding area.' The plaintiff fell into the hole, and sued the
excavator for his failure to light it.9' "The court viewed the digging
of the hole and the failure to light it as one complex act rather than
two separate events, one as an act, the other a failure to act."
2
Much like the sheriff holding the ladder, the Newton court viewed
the totality of the defendant's conduct as "active," rather than
"passive," at least for the purpose of imposing liability.93
B. Policy Reasons Behind the Lack of a Duty to Assist
There are many reasons behind the lack of a duty to assist in
American law; one such reason often cited is to preserve the
principle of- personal autonomy. 94 A discussion of personal auton-
omy usually centers around the causation issue in failure to assist
cases. 9' Scholars often argue, as did the Tennessee Supreme Court
in Bradshaw v. Daniels, that there is a grave distinction between
causing harm and failing to prevent harm.96 Some scholars argue
that the difference is significant enough to require liability in the
first instance, if not in the second.' Hence, the argument runs,
when one merely allows harm to happen, instead of consciously
88. 119 Eng. Rep. 424 (K.B. 1855); see also Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a
Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247 (1980) reprinted in A TORTS ANTHOLOGY 126
(Lawrence C. Levine, Julie A. Davies, & Edward J Kionka eds. 1993). Weinrib
discusses this case and its impact upon the nonfeasance doctrine. See id.; see also
infra Part I(B)(2).
89. See Newton, 119 Eng. Rep. at 424.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See Weinrib, supra note 88, at 129.
93. See id.
94. See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151
(1973) reprinted in A TORTS ANTHOLOGY, supra note 88, at 123. Epstein discusses
some of the reasons behind a lack of a duty to assist. See id.; see also infra Part
I(C).
95. See id.
96. See id.; see also Bradshaw v. Daniel, 854 S.W.2d 865, 870 (Tenn. 1983);
supra note 60 and accompanying text.
97. See Epstein, supra note 94, at 124-125.
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causing it to happen, one's personal autonomy should not be
violated by the imposition of liability.
Also, as in Beardsley, courts are reluctant to merge what they
see as a moral judgment with legal liability." Some scholars even
assert that the lack of a duty to assist is aligned with common law
morality.99 This, again, is tied to a personal autonomy argument-
some opponents of duty to assist statutes argue that the decision
not to assist someone is personal and rooted in basic ideas of justice
and fairness.' °°
Some authors also insist that nonfeasance can be viewed in
terms of a cost-benefit analysis.' They argue that the costs of
assisting someone may outweigh the benefits; any such costs may
indeed be economic."°2 For example, if only one doctor knows the
cure for a deadly but rare disease, presumably under a duty to assist
statute he would be required to fly around the world curing it.'03 In
short, "[s]trong arguments [have been] advanced to show that the
common law position on the Good Samaritan problem is in the end
consistent with both moral and economic principles.'
Part II
A. The Reasonably Prudent Person Doctrine, and the Exemption
for Nonfeasance
The doctrine of nonfeasance, as a per se rule disallowing
98. See Beardsley, 113 N.W. at 1131; see also supra Part I(A)(1).
99. See Epstein, supra note 94, at 125; see also infra Part 1(C).
100. See id. Epstein argues that the utilitarian views held by proponents of duty
to assist laws "must in the end find some special place for the claims of egoism
which are an inseparable byproduct of the belief that individual autonomy-
individual liberty-is a good in itself not explainable in terms of its purported
social worth." Id. at 125. But see generally Ames, supra note 23. Further, as
discussed in supra Part I(A)(2), other commentators argue that personal autonomy
should give way to the protection of persons in danger of bodily harm. See id.
101. See Epstein, supra note 94, at 125; see also United States v. Carroll Towing,
159 F.2d 169 (2nd Cir. 1947). Epstein discusses the cost-benefit formula derived
from Carroll Towing and its application to nonfeasance. See Epstein, supra note
94, at 125. The Carroll Towing formula dictates that there is a duty between a
plaintiff and a defendant only if three conditions are algebraically related. See
Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 169. The formula states that if the burden on the
defendant to take precautions to protect the plaintiff, (B), is less than the
probability of harm to the plaintiff, (P), multiplied by the severity of harm, (H),
the defendant has a duty to take those precautions. See id. Thus, if B is less than
H times P, the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff. See id.
102. See Epstein, supra note 94, at 125.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 126.
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recovery, overlooks the most fundamental concept in negligence
law-the "reasonably prudent person" doctrine that otherwise
governs every action a person takes."
It is fundamental that negligence is tested by whether the
reasonable person at the time and place would recognize and
foresee an unreasonable risk or likelihood of harm or danger to
others. The standard of care is the conduct of a reasonable
person of ordinary prudence under the circumstances. The
standard necessarily imports varying amounts of care in relation
to the variable element of risk of harm. The greater the risk, the
greater the care required."6
The reasonably prudent person doctrine has long been
recognized as the general "standard of due care" owed to persons
with whom we interact on a daily basis.1" It has been said that this
'duty takes into account the circumstances surrounding the incident;
it allows the jury essentially to step into the shoes of the defendant
and determine how he 'should' have behaved."
Nevertheless, American law has traditionally qualified the
meaning of how a reasonable person should act by forcing upon
tort law the artificial concept of nonfeasance.1" Effectively, the
doctrine of nonfeasance abridges the liability of persons who refuse
to assist others in times of distress or peril.1 ' Because no legal duty
to act exists, American courts consistently hold that persons who
fail to assist crime or accident victims have not caused actionable
harm. Accordingly, the possibility that the conduct would be seen
as unreasonable by a judge or jury is completely disregarded by the
justice system."'
Case law has specifically noted that the imposition of liability
for negligence and misfeasance requires a reasonableness inquiry,
105. See Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 426 A.2d 521, 524 (N.J. 1981) (using the
language "reasonable person of ordinary prudence.")
106. Id.
107. See Weinberg v. Dinger, 524 A.2d 366, 374 (N.J. 1987). ("The standard of
care ordinarily imposed by negligence law is well established.")
108. See Coburn v. City of Tucson, 691 P.2d 1078, 1080 (Ariz. 1984). ("[T]he
duty remains constant, while the conduct necessary to fulfill it varies with the
circumstances ... ").
109. See Jackson, 675 N.E.2d at 1358.("Ordinarily, an individual possesses no
duty to act affirmatively for the protection of others and the fact that harm to
another is foreseeable as a result of a failure to act does not create a duty to
prevent harm.... "); see also supra note 15 and accompanying text.
110. See Jackson, 675 N.E.2d at 1358.
111. See id.; see also supra Part I(A)(1) for a discussion of duty in nonfeasance
cases.
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whereas disallowing recovery for nonfeasance does not. For
example, in Mattice v. Goodman,112 the court defined misfeasance as
"not exercising reasonable care when acting," and nonfeasance as
"not performing voluntary tasks in all instances, where there is no
duty to act.""3 Without a requirement for reasonableness, then, the
doctrine of nonfeasance operates as an exception to the otherwise
widespread reasonably prudent person standard.
B. Other Exemptions to the Reasonableness Doctrine
Beyond the generally imposed duty to act reasonably, and
other than situations of nonfeasance, there are certain circum-
stances wherein American law imposes heightened duties above the
reasonably prudent person standard."' Breaches of these height-
ened duties can result in either criminal or civil liability for those
who breach that duty.'15 Unlike the general duty to act reasonably,
these heightened duties often impose an affirmative duty to act, in
direct contrast to the doctrine of nonfeasance."6
There are well-developed circumstances where persons
involved in certain special relationships are required to act. For
example, parents owe duties to care for their children,"7 and
spouses owe the same to each other.' Moreover, when a defend-
ant causes harm to a plaintiff through an act of negligence or
malice, and subsequently refuses assistance, the defendant can be
held liable for failing to act. 9 But these duties are imposed upon
willing or at least involved actors-parents and spouses, for example,
know that when they enter into such relationships they have duties
to care and provide for each other.
112. 527 N.E.2d 469 (Ill. App. 1 Dist. 1988).
113. See id. at 472.
114. See Helm v. Inter-Ins. Exchange for Auto. Club, 192 S.W. 2d 417, 420 (Mo.
1946) (discussing the heightened duty arising from contractual obligations).
115. See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2258 (1994), making breach of the duty to
report child abuse punishable as a class B misdmeanor.
116. See Harzfeld's, Inc. v. Otis Elevator Co., 114 F. Supp. 480, 483 (D.Mo.
1953) (discussing the existence of a duty to act affirmatively and subsequent
liability upon breach of that duty).
117. See Florio, 784 S.W.2d at 417; see also supra note 31.
118. See Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr.2d 16, 17-18 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1993)
(discussing that the marital duty of support encompasses not only physical care,
but also emotional care and love).
119. See Weinrib, supra note 88, at 128-130.
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Other duties are contractual; landlord-tenant duties,12 doctor-
patient duties,'21 and fiduciary duties to professional clients '22 are all
duties that parties know exist and are entered into willingly.'23 The
rationale for this seems to be based upon the choice of the actors-
when persons decide to take on responsibilities above and beyond
that of a stranger to another stranger, they should be responsible
for a greater duty of care. This duty is also applicable to actors who
knowingly create dangerous situations; once they have chosen to
act, courts hold that they are or should be aware of the
124consequences of their actions.
Other heightened duties, however, are imposed upon persons
who may have no relation to as other involved person at all, and
who have not consciously or willingly undertaken a heightened duty
or precipitated a dangerous condition. For example, landowners
have certain duties to trespassers that wander onto land unseen and
uninvited, even in the absence of any contractual duty.
125
Statutes also impose duties people would not ordinarily know
existed. Although perhaps merely a legislative attempt to codify
the definition of reasonableness, some statutes impose affirmative
duties upon tavern owners to withhold liquor from clearly
intoxicated persons. Owners who breach this duty can face liability
for resulting injuries to third persons harmed in drunk driving
120. See Crowell v. McCaffrey, 386 N.E.2d 1256 (Mass. 1979) (imposing upon
landlords the duty to keep their leased premises habitable).
121. See Sugarman v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 662 N.E.2d 1020
(Mass. 1996).
122. See id.
123. See Vanegrift v. Am. Brands Corp., 572 F. Supp. 496 (D.N.H. 1983)
(discussing the duties imposed for those who undertake contractual obligations).
In cases such as these, since one undertakes a duty to contract, tort law might
enforce that duty above and beyond the plaintiff's contractual remedies. See id.;
see also 86 C.J.S. Torts § 4(a) (1997), "Mere nonfeasance, even if it amounts to a
willful neglect to perform a contract, is not sufficient, although where performance
of contractual obligations has induced detrimental reliance on continued
performance, mere inaction may give rise to tort liability ... " See id. "Tort
liability of the parties to a contract arises from the breach of some positive legal
duty imposed by law because of the relationship of the parties, rather than from a
mere omission to perform a contract obligation." See id. Note that the
"relationship of the parties" is the impetus behind most heightened duties; parties
to a contract are no different. See id.
124. See, e.g., Newton v. Ellis, 119 Eng. Rep. 424 (K.B. 1855).
125. See Ryals v. United States Steel Corp., 562 So.2d 192 (Ala. 1990) (holding
that even as to trespassers, landowners generally owe a duty to avoid wanton
injury). But see Scurti v. City of New York, 354 N.E.2d 794 (N.Y. 1976). This
Comment advocates the approach followed in Scurti, which holds that the duty
should be one of reasonable care as determined by a jury. See id.
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accidents.126 Similarly, some statutes impose upon film developers
the duty to report child abuse even when there is no relationship of
the developer to the child victim.
27
Part III
A. Modern Trends in the Law
1. Case Law-In recent years, some jurisdictions have gone
outside the realm of "action" or "duty," and looked only at
"reasonableness," in direct contrast to the traditional view of
nonfeasance. Specifically, these courts have disbanded the notion
that bystanders never have a duty to assist accident victims. 12 In
Soldano v. O'Daniels,129 the court held that a restaurant owner
owed a murder victim a duty to call police when a death threat was
made or to permit a third person to use a telephone.30 In Soldano,
a patron had seen the victim being threatened with a gun, and
rushed into the defendant's restaurant in order to assist the
victim.'31 The restauranteur's employee, however, refused to call
the police himself or to allow the patron to use the restaurant's
telephone.32
In reversing summary judgment, the court rejected the
restauranteur's argument that the common law never imposed a
duty to rescue one in peril, citing the "special relationship"
exception to the rule.133 Although the court did not find a "special
relationship" between the defendant and the victim, it went on to
fashion an additional exception to nonfeasance for this conduct.
134
The court based its new exception on public policy, namely, the
126. See Brigance v. Velvet Dove Restaurant, 725 P.2d 300 (Okla. 1986).
Brigance discusses the common law rule of liability for tavern owners and the
passage of dram shop statutes imposing such a duty. See id. The Brigance court
also imposed such a duty in the absence of such a statute under a "reasonable
care" analysis, much like that urged in this Comment. See id.
127. See 42 U.S.C. § 13031 (1994) (federal statute requiring a host of defined
professionals to report child abuse upon their learning of facts "that give reason to
suspect" a child has been abused); 18 U.S.C. § 1169 (1994) (federal statute
requiring officers in Indian reserves to report child abuse); 18 U.S.C. § 2258 (1994)
(federal statute making the failure to report child abuse a class B misdemeanor).
128. See Soldano v. O'Daniels, 141 Cal. App.3d 443 (Cal. App. 5 Dist. 1983).
129. Id.
130. See id. at 453.
131. See id. at 446.
132. See id.




encouragement of citizen involvement in crime prevention.'
Considering the importance of the telephone to such a policy, the
court reasoned that telephones in businesses open to the public
need to be available during business hours to persons seeking
assistance in situations involving imminent danger of physical
harm.136
However, the court underlined the narrow scope of its new
rule by expressly exempting private residences from its operation.
The court reasoned that imposing a duty to aid the rescue attempt
in the present case by permitting use of a telephone was but a small
departure from the "morally questionable" rule of nonliability for
inaction absent a specified duty.3'
In defining liability for duty to assist cases, the Soldano case
thus creates a problem: failing to act reasonably can be both non-
actionable and actionable depending upon how the court defines
"action," "duty," and "reasonableness." The prima facie tort case
based upon the "reasonably prudent person" duty is the standard
all over the country. And as a result of the requirement of
"reasonableness," courts and legislatures have deemed it prudent to
force people in certain relationships to act affirmatively.
140
Practically speaking, though, these rules encompass different
standards in different jurisdictions. Occasionally, even seeming
inaction by persons between whom no duty exists has been
actionable when the court characterizes the inaction as action.
141
The Soldano case and the Cash scenario illustrate this point.
In both cases, the actors were bystanders, uninvolved in the
accident they had just witnessed. 142  The bystander of Sherrice
Iverson's murder will never be charged with a crime either because
his conduct can be viewed as "passive," or because he had no duty
to assist her.' The other is found to be liable for his conduct
because the court, after examining public policy, found he had
committed an "action" in derogation of his duty for the purposes of
tort liability."
135. See id. at 449.
136. See id. at 452.
137. See id.
138. See Soldano, 141 Cal. App. 3d at 455.
139. See, e.g., Jackson v. Forest City Enterprises, 675 N.E.2d 1356, 1358 (Ohio
App. 1996); see also supra text accompanying note 23.
140. See supra Part II(B).
141. See Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006; see also supra Part I(A)(2).
142. See Soldano, 141 Cal. App. 3d 443; see also Dyckman, supra note 4.
143. See Dyckman, supra note 4 and accompanying text.
144. See Soldano, 141 Cal. App. 3d 443.
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At least two courts, though, have undertaken to adopt a system
of liability based solely upon reasonableness, disregarding the
traditional emphasis on duty or action through some recent cases.141
In New Jersey, the tension between action and inaction has been
the subject of such a transformation in the specific area of spousal
liability.146  Until recently, New Jersey courts abided by the
traditional concept of nonfeasance in suits against spouses of sexual
offenders. 14 7 In Rozycki v. Peley, parents of a group of young boys
who were sexually molested by a neighbor sued the neighbor's wife,
alleging that she knew of her husband's pedophilia, and that she
had a duty to warn the boys of his dangerous tendencies.1 4 8  In
examining the parents' claims, the Superior court noted that the
"[p]laintiffs' contention [was] essentially based on public policy
considerations. They argue[d] that there is a broad public interest
in preventing sexual assault on small children which requires the
imposition of a duty. '1 49 The court also noted the plaintiffs' "special
relationship" contention, stating that the plaintiffs "analogize[d] the
instant case to situations in which parents have been held
responsible for the torts of their children, or landowners held liable
for the dangerous condition of their property.''5
While sustaining the wife's motion for summary judgment, the
court, in keeping with the traditional rule of nonfeasance, held that
the wife did not have a duty to warn the victims of her husband's
tendencies."' In doing so, the court examined several cases in
which it believed such a duty was recognized, such as in the context
of a relationship with a therapist or a doctor, and refused to extend
that reasoning to spousal immunity.152 Specifically, the court noted
the lack of precedential rulings imposing a duty upon spouses of
pedophiles to warn potential victims.1"3 The court also distinguished
cases that have imposed such a duty to warn on the ground that
those cases were limited to instances involving mental health
professionals.
But just as the public policy argument was firmly rejected in
Rozycki, it was embraced in a subsequent decision by the New
145. See Rozycki v. Peley, 489 A.2d 1272 (N.J. 1984).
146. See id.
147. See id.
14& See id. at 1272.
149. See id. at 1273.
150. See Rozycki, 489 A.2d at 1273.
151. See id. at 1277.
152. See id. at 1274-76.




Jersey Supreme Court, directly overruling the earlier superior court
decision.' In J.S. v. R. TH., parents brought suit against the wife of
a man who sexually abused their two daughters.56 In J.S., the court
decided the issue of spousal liability based not upon a heightened
duty ascribed to the wife, but upon the traditional duty to be a
reasonably prudent person.'57 The court detailed
[a]fter "weighing... the relationship of the parties, the nature
of the risk, and the public interest," Goldberg, supra, 38 N.J. at
583, 186 A.2d 291, we conclude that if plaintiffs prove Mary was
aware of her husband's conduct or history, it was foreseeable
that he posed a danger to these young girls, and it is fair to hold
that Mary had a duty to take reasonable steps to protect them
from such danger. Our conclusion derives from the continuity
and nature of the social relationship between these next-door
neighbors and the girls' habitual and repeated visits of which
Mary was clearly aware. Under such circumstances, the girls
and their parents had a reasonable expectation that Mary would
not knowingly expose them to the risk of sexual assault by her
own husband. It will be a jury's role to determine the specific
contours of her duty, and whether she deviated therefrom,
based upon its findings as to the extent of her knowledge and
the foreseeability of harm."'
More recently, South Carolina has followed the same
principles discussed throughout J.S. in another failure to warn case
involving child sexual abuse. In Doe v. Batson, 9 a man had abused
several boys in the home he shared with his mother. After the man
had been convicted of seventeen counts of child abuse, the parents
of his victims brought a negligence suit against his mother for
failure to warn them of the man's sexual propensities.' In the suit,
the parents alleged that the defendant mother knew her son was
taking his young victims into his bedroom, and therefore, should
have warned the parents. 6'
155. See J.S. v. R.T.H., 693 A.2d 1191 (N.J. 1997).
156. See id.
157. See id. at 1193-94.
158. Id. at 1194. Ironically, this "reasonableness" requirement was effectively
legitimized years ago even though it was not embraced throughout the doctrine of
nonfeasance. If it were not reasonable to make someone liable for inaction, as in
J.S., the definition of nonfeasance would not ever have been defined as "the failure
to do that which ought to be done." See id.; see also supra Part I.
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At the trial court level, summary judgment was granted against
the victims' parents' for failure to state a claim; the court found no
duty to warn under the circumstances alleged as a matter of law.162
The court of appeals reversed, noting that the question of liability
under the circumstances alleged was a novel question in South
Carolina law.1"3 After discussing the general proposition of non-
liability for nonfeasance, the court noted the state's doctrine of
imposing liability upon persons who fail to control the behavior of
people in custody such as prisoners' The reasoning was based
upon the "special relationship" theory, in that the person
supervising one in custody is in the best position to warn outsiders
of harm.165
The court discussed that other states, including New Jersey, are
increasingly reviewing the question of liability under circumstances
involving child sexual abuse."6 In reversing the summary judgment
ruling, the court also noted that the parents' may have had a viable
claim under a premises liability theory, as well as under a special
relationship theory.67
2. State Bills and Statutes-Other solutions to this melting pot
of tort law are increasingly being codified by state legislatures
through criminal statutes. Similar to New Jersey's and South
Carolina's approach to spousal liability, the laws being introduced
represent a movement to broaden the definition of what is required
of a "reasonably prudent person" to include affirmative action.
This approach not only allows for a unilateral application of the
law, but guards against imposing liability when a reasonable person
would not have acted. An expansion of the "reasonableness" test
also guards against forcing people to interject in dangerous
situations - it is difficult to call jeopardizing one's own safety
"reasonable," just as it may be difficult to define failing to call 911
as "reasonable."
Although the new statutes codify this expanded definition of
reasonableness, many of them are typically child-abuse specific.'"
The Texas legislature recently passed a law making it illegal for a
witness to child abuse to fail to either assist the child or report the
162. See id. at *1.
163. See id. at *4.




168. See Girl's murder prompts California to consider 'Good Samaritan' laws,
supra note 18, at A22.
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abuse, even if the witness has no prior relationship to the child.'69
The law requires the witness to judge whether a "reasonable person
would believe" that an offense was being committed, specifically
expanding the reasonableness rationale to include the affirmative
acts required by the statute.7 ° The Act also allows a witness to
avoid conviction when he or she would be put in "danger of
suffering serious bodily injury or death.'
71
In New Jersey, an analogous bill was recently passed making it
a crime for an adult to fail to report an incident of sexual abuse
against a child. 172 Similarly, in California, three such bills have been
introduced that would protect children. 73  One bill makes it a
misdemeanor to fail to report a violent crime against anyone, a
sexual crime against anyone under 14, or an assault on a child that
is likely to cause substantial bodily harm to the child.17' A second
requires anyone who witnesses a murder, rape or other serious
assault to report the incident to police as soon as possible.' Failure
to report such crimes can be either a felony or a misdemeanor,
depending on the discretion of the local district attorney.'76 The
third makes it a felony to fail to report sexual assaults or violent
crimes against anyone under 16.17' The bill also contains an
exception to prosecution if the witness fears retaliation.
7
1
169. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.17 (West 1994). The Act provides that:
a) A person, other than a person who has a relationship with a child
described by Section 22.04(b), commits an offense if: (1) the actor
observes the commission or attempted commission of an offense
prohibited by Section 22.021(a)(2)(B) under circumstances in which a
reasonable person would believe that an offense of a sexual or assaultive
nature was being committed or was about to be committed against the
child; (2) the actor fails to assist the child or immediately report the
commission of the offense to a peace officer or law enforcement agency;
and (3) the actor could assist the child or immediately report the
commission of the offense without placing the actor in danger of suffering
serious bodily injury or death.




172. See Finz, supra note 18, at A21.
173. See Girl's Murder Prompts California to Consider 'Good Samaritan' Laws,





178. See Girl's murder prompts California to consider 'Good Samaritan' laws,
supra note 18, at A22.
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Likewise, in Nevada, a newly introduced statute also carries a
serious penalty-persons who fail to report sexual abuse against a
child can face a felony conviction.179 A similar bill is being backed
in Michigan by two state senators and the state attorney general.'"
This bill would "punish witnesses with up to four years in prison for
failing to report the abuse, kidnapping or serious injury of a
child." 8
These statutes may well represent a change in the law that will
effectuate protection of children. But such statutes can only be
effective if there is momentum to enforce them in the individual
states. Surprisingly, at least six states have had duty to assist
statutes protecting both children and adults in effect for several
years, but the failure to enforce the statutes renders them useless.82
Vermont has had such a law since 1967, however, officials say
that it may never have been used. 83  John T. Quinn chairs the
executive board for Vermont's county prosecutors.' 4 He says, "I
have been in this state 20 years, and I can't recall a case where we
used this statute... ,185 Referred to as the Duty to Aid the
Endangered Act, Vermont's law requires anyone who observes a
person subject to "grave physical harm" to render "reasonable
assistance," unless aid would result in danger to the bystander.'9
Violating the law carries a $100 fine. 87
Wisconsin has a similar statute that largely remains dormant9
This statute also requires bystanders to assist crime victims, but has
liberal exception provisions if the bystander would be in danger or
if someone else has rendered assistance.9  Yet, in the eight years
directly following its inception, the law was not enforced once.'" In
1992, the law was applied for the first time to prosecute two people
179. See Maura Dolan, 'Good Samaritan' Laws Are Hard to Enact, Experts Say
Aid: Outrage over inaction of Strohmeyer friend sparks calls for bills. But existing
legislation has limited success, L.A. TIMES, September 9, 1998, at Al.
180. See TRIBUNE NEWS SERVICES, supra note 13, at 3.
181. See id.
182. See Pardun, supra note 14, at 596-97.
183. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1967); see also Dolan, supra note 179, at
Al.




188. See WiS. STAT. § 940.34. (West Supp. 1999); see also Dave Daley, Few
prosecuted under state 'Samaritan' law; Like France, Wisconsin requires residents to
help crime, accident victims, MILWAUKEE J. SENT., September 5, 1997, at 9.




for failing to assist a 16-year old-girl who was being "savagely
beaten at a party."'19'
"The two.. .were sentenced to probation, fined $300 each and
ordered to perform community service after a jury found they
should have helped the girl, beaten after she rebuffed the sexual
advances of another partygoer."'"
In 1994, a Wisconsin appellate court upheld the statute in the
face of a defendant's constitutional challenge. 93 Nevertheless, the
statute is still rarely applied.94  James Haney is the Wisconsin
Attorney General's director of research and information.9 In a
recent interview, Haney indicated that prosecutors have rarely
called his office with questions about enforcing the failure to assist
statute.9 6 Haney also said, in explaning the dearth of calls, "It's not
the kind of issue that we heard a lot about,... [w]hile it might be a
little rosy-eyed to say this, I think the good people of Wisconsin
generally aid victims when they see them in trouble."'"
Several other states have similar statutes lying dormant on
their books. Both Ohio and Washington have enacted statutes
requiring bystanders to aid police officers.98 Washington's statute
provides for misdemeanor penalties when one, "upon request by a
person he knows to be a peace officer, ... unreasonably refuses or
fails to summon aid for such peace officer."' 99 The Ohio statute, on
the other hand, specifically provides an exception for liability when
a bystander would be put in apparent risk.2 ° The Ohio statute
reads in pertinent part:
No person shall negligently fail or refuse to aid a law
enforcement officer, when called upon for assistance in
preventing or halting the commission of an offense, or in
apprehending or detaining an offender, when such aid can be










198. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.23 (Banks-Baldwin 1997); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9A.76.030 (West 1988).
199. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 9A.76.030.
200. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.23.
201. See id.
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Two other statutes directly codify the "reasonableness"
approach in cases involving civilian victims.2 Massachusetts's duty
to assist statute provides in pertinent part:
Whoever knows that another person is a victim of aggravated
rape, rape, murder, manslaughter or armed robbery and is at the
scene of said crime shall, to the extent that said person can do so
without danger or peril to himself or others, report said crime to
an appropriate law enforcement official as soon as reasonably
practicable. Any person who violates this section shall be
punished by a fine of not less than five hundred nor more than
two thousand and five hundred dollars.2 3
Although this statute provides for a determination based upon
reasonableness, it actually does nothing more than ensure that the
police eventually will be involved. Rhode Island's duty to assist
statute, in contrast, provides for assistance, and not mere reporting:
Any person at the scene of an emergency who knows that
another person is exposed to, or has suffered, grave physical
harm shall, to the extent that he or she can do so without danger
or peril to himself or herself or to others, give reasonable
assistance to the exposed person. Any person violating the
provisions of this section shall be guilty of a petty misdemeanor
and shall be subject to imprisonment for a term not exceeding
six (6) months or by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars
204($500), or both.
The use of the word "emergency" in the Rhode Island statute
presumably allows for prosecution when people refuse to give
assistance at the scenes of both crimes and accidents. In any event,
many of these statutes allow a jury to decide the question of
reasonableness in the context of duty to assist cases.20 ' The statutes
also require this inquiry to be objective. For example, since the
Rhode Island statute requires "reasonable assistance" and the
Massachusetts statute requires assistance "within a reasonable
time," there is no room for defendants to evade responsibility by
pointing to their subjective beliefs when an otherwise reasonable
person would have rendered assistance.
202. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268, § 40 (West 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
11-56-1 (1984).
203. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268, § 40.




B. How the Changing Law is More Effective
1. Current Confusion in Defining "Duty" and
"Action/Inaction "-The current system of imposing liability based
upon "duty" or "action/inaction" is inconsistent at best, and a clear
rejection of typical American negligence principles at worst. An
examination of Barber within the concept of "action/inaction"
analysis illustrates these inconsistencies in the basic definitions of
American law.2 In Barber, the court could have determined that
the doctor's removal of feeding tubes was within the duty of
reasonable care he owed to the victim, without attempting to
determine whether his acts were in fact omissions. This analysis
seems especially appropriate considering the "victim's" articulated
wishes not to be kept alive by machines."7 But by defining the
defendant's conduct as omission, Barber stands for the proposition
that defendants who engage in voluntary acts, as overt as physically
removing feeding tubes, may not be acting at all.2°8 Moore, on the
other hand, stands for exactly the opposite proposition: that one
who stops in the middle of an action, such as holding a ladder,
without more has committed an actionable affirmative overt act.2°
Both Barber and Moore involve defendants who ceased to
provide services that they had previously provided for the plaintiff
or victim. The only difference between the actions of the two
defendants is that one removed his hands and walked away from a
ladder, and the other physically removed a feeding tube.
Presumably, the acts of removing one's hands from a ladder and
pulling tubes out of a patient's body are somewhat similar in effect.
If anything, the removal of tubing seems to be more "overt" in the
length of time and the amount of contact required of the defendant.
Usually, in civil cases where liability hinges on the definition of
"action," courts distinguish action from inaction without much
analysis or explanation; yet, the definition often changes from case
to case. In some civil cases, "action" is defined with regard to
"purpose," or "awareness," as in the criminal context.10 As a
206. See Barber v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1983); see also supra Part I(A)(2) (discussing the Barber "action/inaction"
analysis).
207. See Barber, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
208. See id.
209. See Moore v. Murphy, 119 N.W. 2d. 759 (Iowa 1963). Moore discusses the
conduct in question as "misfeasance," the designation typically reserved for
affirmative conduct leading to liability. See id. at 761.
210. See supra Part I(A)(2); see also A.P. Simester, New Voices in Criminal
Theory, On the So-called Requirement for Voluntary Action, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L.
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consequence, there is virtually no way to predict, especially in close
cases and in the light of cases like Barber, how a court will rule if a
defendant asserts the defense of not committing an overt act.
At the very least, courts' characterization of the distinction
between nonfeasance and misfeasance is often unclear. From case
to case, the definition of nonfeasance is virtually identical to
traditional definitions of misfeasance."' In Casale v. Housing
Authority of City of Newark, the court discussed a claim against a
city for failing to shovel snow on a public sidewalk.212 The court
discussed the thesis that "the omission to take precautions in
something that ought to be done has the same legal consequence as
the commission of something that ought not to be done." '213
Ironically enough, the court's rationale in discussing wrongdoing,
that the defendants "ought" to have acted, is exactly the definition
of nonfeasance that typically results in non-liability for defendants,
as discussed in the Beardsley case.214
It makes little difference to the outcome of any given case,
though, whether a court chooses to negate liability on the basis of
no "action" or a lack of a duty. If a duty exists, either that duty
imposes an affirmative act, or it does not; any superficial discussion
of whether the defendant's conduct is active or passive is
unnecessary. In discussing the lack of an "action," courts in most
cases could simply define the duty involved as not encompassing
affirmative action.
This distinction of "active" and "passive" conduct constituting
a basis for imposing liability has not gone without criticism. " In
examining Newton, Ernest Weinrib writes, "[f]or principled use by
REV. 403 (1998). Simester attempts to create a concrete definition of "overt act"
for the purposes of tort law. See id. Simester discusses the difficulty of
determining the "action" in tort cases, and details the importance, above all, of
moral culpability in establishing criminal guilt. See id. Simester's analysis can be
applied to the Cash scenario; Simester specifically argues that omissions, being
different from overt actions, are difficult to define and therefore punish. See id. at
417-418. Yet, as this Comment argues, if Cash were punished based upon moral
culpability, as is the practical basis of all criminal statutes, the definition of his
"action" or "inaction" would be unnecessary. See id..
211. See Casale v. City of Newark, 125 A.2d 895 (N.J. 1956).
212. See id.
213. See id. at 897.
214. See id. In Casale, the court determined that the city would not be liable for
the Plaintiff's harm, not because of a lack of wrongdoing, but because the failure to
act was attributable to the city's agents and not to the city itself. See id. The court
noted that the doctrine of respondeat superior did not apply to a nonfeasance
scenario, even if "there was some proof of active wrongdoing in this case." See id.
at 897; see also People v. Beardsley, 113 N.W. 1128, 1131 (Mich. 1907).
215. See Weinrib, supra note 88, at 129.
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courts, the unelaborated distinction between active and passive
conduct is inadequate.""21 Weinrib goes on to detail the difficulties
with an analysis based on action. 17 He argues that defendants
pleading nonfeasance based on the lack of an "overt act" really are
"acting" by virtue of their omissions."' "Indeed, [the defendant's]
act may have been quite callously deliberate, as when an employer
vindictively refuses to make an elevator available to employees who
wish to emerge from a mine., 219 Weinrib also suggests that "[a]
defendant in a nonfeasance case, then, can concede that in one
sense he has acted yet argue that in a second sense he has not
acted.
220
At least one court has abandoned a similar "antiquated"
distinction in American law in favor of a "reasonableness"
standard; in Scurti v. City of New York, the plaintiff had sued a
municipality for the death of his son.221 His son, in trespassing upon
a city-owned railroad yard, had been electrocuted by high-voltage
22wires. The trial court had granted summary judgment for the
defendant, based upon the traditional distinctions of the duties
owed to trespassers, licensees, and invitees. 23 The court noted that
the plaintiff's claim had been dismissed by the lower court because
he had been a trespasser at the time of his death, thus, under the
traditional distinctions the defendant owed him only the duty to
refrain from "willful or wanton injury.,
24
Nevertheless, the court "held that the liability of a landowner
to one injured upon his property should be governed, not by the
ancient and antiquated distinctions between trespassers, licensees,
and invitees decisive under common law, but rather by the standard
applicable to negligence cases generally, i.e., the 'standard of
216. See id. The Restatement (Second) of Torts has noted that one possible
reason for the distinction between "action" and "inaction" may be outdated.
In the early law, one who injured another by a positive affirmative act
was held liable without any great regard even for his fault. But the courts
were far too much occupied with the more flagrant forms of misbehavior
to be greatly concerned with one who merely did nothing, even though
another might suffer serious harm because of his omission to act. Hence,
liability for nonfeasance was slow to receive any recognition in the law.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. c, at 116-17 (1965).




221. 387 N.Y.S.2d 55 (1976).
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. See id. at 57.
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reasonable care under the circumstances where by foreseeability
shall be a measure of liability.' ,225
2. Personal Autonomy and Causation-As indicated above,
critics who decry the imposition of a duty to assist often rely on
arguments associated with personal autonomy or causation. Both
doctrines, however, have their limits. Personal autonomy is no
doubt an important concept in American jurisprudence. But this
right is greatly restricted through statutes or common law creating
heightened duties in certain relationships or contracts.
Additionally, one does not have the personal autonomy to act
generally as an unreasonable person would. Actually, the
reasonableness doctrine, even if applied to nonfeasance, grants
most Americans the greatest personal autonomy, available-the
right to act as we normally would want to.
In the reasonableness context, people are typically seen as
"unreasonable" for doing things that infringe upon another
person's personal autonomy. Courts find persons liable when they
assault someone against that person's will, or when they negligently
cause harm to someone's reputation with libelous action.
A reasonableness test also addresses the cost-benefit analysis
discussed by opponents of the duty to assist. By definition, if a
decision not to assist would fail a cost-benefit analysis, such a
decision most likely would not be found reasonable by a jury.
Likewise, it does not necessarily follow that one who has failed
to assist another person in a time of distress has not caused or
furthered the victim's pain. Although it can be argued that there is
a difference between directly causing harm and merely allowing
harm to happen, the analysis in failure to assist cases fulfills the
traditional "but for" causation test.226 This test dictates that if "but
for" the defendant's conduct the plaintiff would not have been
harmed.227 Obviously, "but for" David Cash's failure to assist
Sherrice Iverson, there is a reasonable probability that she would
be alive today.
The causation analysis also fails the proximate cause test, as
least as it is defined with reasonableness in mind.22 If a jury were
allowed to make a determination of liability, it might easily
225. See id. at 55.
226. See Salinetro v. Nystrom, 341 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1977).
227. Salinetro details the counterfactual test of causation; it asks what would
have happened if the defendant had not acted. See id. The test essentially requires
a finder of fact to imagine an alternative set of events bearing no relation to what
really happened in order to determine liability. See id.
228. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
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determine that the traditional proximate cause test of Palsgraf can
be satisfied in duty to assist cases.229 Palsgraf requires that the
defendant must, under the circumstances, reasonably appreciate
that some danger may result because of his behavior.3° Of special
importance is that Palsgraf does not require a defendant to
appreciate the specific harm involved, just the possibility of an
accident.3
This proximate cause test can be logically applied to failure to
assist cases, in a manner that is consistent with the spirit of Palsgraf.
If a jury would find that a bystander would reasonably know that
his omission would result in harm to an accident or crime victim,
liability would attach. In the case of David Cash, for example, a
jury could have easily found that Cash reasonably knew his failure
to assist Sherrice Iverson resulted in more abuse and torture from
Jeremy Strohmeyer.
3. Morality-Perhaps the best reason behind enforcing duty
to assist laws is the reason no legal scholar wants to discuss-the
issue of morality. As was discussed in Beardsley and Knowles,
courts are reluctant to impose a seemingly moralistic obligation on
uninvolved actors.232 But the evolution of any law is ultimately tied
to society's sense of right and wrong; it is spurred by a feeling of
what one "should do. 2'33  As one author suggests, the morality
concern surrounding nonfeasance is what makes it such a
contentious issue:
Both courts and commentators generally consider it morally
outrageous that the defense of nonfeasance can deny
endangered persons a legal right to an easy rescue. Yet the
defense is taken to be so basic to the law and so compelling that
it overrides the moral perceptions of the judges and the shared





232. See People v. Beardsley, 113 N.W. 1128 (Mich. 1907); U.S. v. Knowles, 26
Fed. Cas. 800 (N.D. Cal. 1864).
233. See JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 80-82 (1883), for a discussion of how morality is the impetus for all
criminal law and the determination of punishment. "The sentence of the law is to
the moral sentiment of the public in relation to any offence what a seal is to hot
wax. It converts into a permanent final judgment what might otherwise be a
transient sentiment." Id.
234. See Weinrib, supra note 88, at 131.
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In short, there is no reason why American law should not be
influenced by some sense of moral right and wrong; it is not a faith
or a religion through which the public was outraged at Cash's
conduct, but through a gut feeling that his failure to assist a seven-
year-old was repugnant. People were not publicly repulsed by
Cash's behavior as a heavy handed attempt to influence politics or
the social arena, but because it viciously affronts something that
Americans hold dear-the right of persons to rely on each other in
true emergency situations.
4. The Nonsense of Abridging Liability for Nonfeasance-As
has been seen, various heightened duties are often imposed as
exceptions to the generally prescribed reasonableness doctrine.
Statutes that impose these duties do so for purposes of preventing
drunk driving deaths, preventing child abuse, and enforcing
contractual agreements. Nonfeasance, then, by lying outside the
doctrine of reasonableness, also operates as an exception to the
general rule of reasonableness. Nonfeasance, however, is an
abridgment of duty, and not an expansion of it. Effectively,
nonfeasance restricts what otherwise would have been a duty if the
question of reasonableness would have been submitted to a jury.
By imposing heightened duties in certain well-delineated and
specific categories, the legislature has merely codified what
society's sense of morality and reasonableness unquestionably says
should be done. For example, it is thought of as reasonable for a
doctor to report child abuse. Similarly, society views it as
reasonable for tavern owners to refrain from serving alcohol to
visibly drunk persons. What the statutes effectively do is ensure
that this reasonableness is uniformly applied across the country.
But the statutes have another altogether prudent purpose for
existing-they put unreasonable people on notice that their
behavior is likely to result in liability. Not only do statutes like this
uniformly apply reasonableness, then, they also act as a way to
make people specifically aware of the potential for liability if they
act unreasonably.
It is difficult to understand why society's sense of morality and
reasonableness should be reflected in the heightened duty statutes
and in common law negligence principles, but not with regard to a
duty to assist. Nonfeasance is essentially a "get out of jail free"
pass. It is a way to act unreasonably that operates contrary to
society's collective sense of morality and even logic. Indeed, the
reasons for "mandated reasonableness" are compelling: preventing




The reasons in support of nonfeasance, on the other hand, are
not as compelling, especially when compared to the rationale
behind the heightened duty statutes. Personal autonomy is
abridged for the sake of abused children, but not when David Cash
watches his friend abuse and murder a young girl. This outcome is
not only illogical, it is also directly contrary to society's notions of
what "should be" the law.
C. Toward a Reasonable Standard of Negligence Law
In order to more consistently apply the concept of
reasonableness in both the criminal and civil contexts, a uniform
duty to assist standard is necessary. Much like the child abuse
statutes, a duty to assist statute would encompass what society
already considers to be reasonable. A statute encompassing the
goal of merging criminal liability with reasonableness might read as
follows:
Criminal Liability for Failure to Assist
1. General Rule: It shall be a crime for witnesses to
violent actions to deny assistance to the victims of such actions.
2. Affirmative defenses: It shall be an affirmative defense to
prosecution under this statute if the defendant reasonably
believed his or her safety would have been endangered by
rendering such assistance. Should the trier of fact find that the
defendant reasonably believed that he or she would be
endangered, or that a defendant's acquaintance or family
member would be endangered, the defendant shall not be
convicted. Also, should the evidence support a finding that the
defendant reasonably believed an attempt to assist would result
in greater harm to the victim, the defendant shall not be
convicted.
3. Exemptions:
Duplicity: Persons shall be exempt from prosecution under this
statute if the trier of fact finds that assistance has already been
rendered to the accident or crime victim, and that the defendant
was aware of such assistance.
Impossibility: Persons shall be exempt from prosecution if the
trier of fact finds that assisting the victim would have been
impossible, by reason of the defendant's mental defect, age or
infirmity, or by physical impossibility.
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Definitions:
Assistance: help in either reporting the incident of crime or
in attempting to stop the crime. For the purpose of this statute,
the requirement to assist may be satisfied by a telephone call to
the proper authorities, but is not limited to such action, nor is
the telephone call specifically required.
Deny: the failure to render, or action which constitutes
assistance being delayed. This term also encompasses
affirmative action which is intended to interfere with the giving
of assistance.
Endangered: put in physical peril, either through direct
threats from the assailant, physical contact from the assailant, or
from the specific circumstances surrounding the incident.
Violent actions: actions that could result in death or
serious bodily harm, including but not limited to actions that
would constitute the crimes of, physical assault, battery, sexual
assault, murder, manslaughter, attempted murder, child abuse,
and rape.
Such a statute would allow a jury to determine if a person like
David Cash acted reasonably in denying Sherrice Iverson
assistance, or whether his actions constituted conduct deserving of
criminal liability. If the trier of fact would determine that a
defendant who refused to offer assistance at the scene of a crime
acted within the bounds of reasonableness, that defendant would
not be punished. On the other hand, if the trier of fact would
determine that reasonable people would have offered assistance,
the defendant would receive punishment for his or her
unreasonable actions.
A corresponding civil statute is also necessary to unilaterally
apply the "reasonableness" approach to failure to assist cases. Such
a statute might read:
Duty to Assist Victims of Emergencies
1. General rule: There shall be imposed upon witnesses
of violent crimes and accidents involving serious bodily injury or
risk of serious bodily injury a duty to report such accidents or
crimes to the appropriate authorities. There shall also be
imposed upon such witnesses a duty to render reasonable
assistance to involved victims.
2000]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
2. Definitions: Reasonable: In determining reasonable-
ness for the purpose of this statute, the trier of fact may take
into account the following factors, but is not limited to these
factors:
1. The witness's objectively reasonable fear of danger to him
or herself, his or her family member or accompanying
bystander, or additional or aggravated danger to the victim,
2. The impossibility of assistance,
3. If assistance has already been rendered and the witness
realizes that fact,
4. The age or infirmity of the witness,
5. The external surroundings of the incident. The trier of fact
may not take the defendant's subjective fear into account if that
fear is not objectively reasonable.
If duty to assist statutes are to be effective nationwide, the
federal government must encourage their passage in all the states.
In order to do this, Congress might condition federal funding on the
passage of such a statute. Congress could also allow states to pass
their own versions of duty to assist statutes, or require passage of a
uniform civil or criminal version. States could be allowed to pass
statutes of this kind without affirmative defenses-that is, a
criminal statute that would require prosecutors to prove the
defendant's safety was not in danger. States could pass versions of
this legislation focusing on either reporting or assisting, or either on
crimes or accidents. States could also be allowed to punish
offenders as they saw fit. Thus, an offense under the criminal
statute could be punished as a misdemeanor or a felony, and civil
statutes could have limited damages provisions. Of course, these
options would mean that the statutes would differ somewhat from
state to state, but at least states would be encouraged to look at
reasonableness when people fail to give assistance to crime and
accident victims.
The tougher question is one of enforcement of the criminal
statutes. 2 5 In order to encourage enforcement, prosecutors could
use these statutes as a basis for plea bargains, as they do for other
235. See Dolan, supra note 179, at Al.
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crimes without necessarily restricting corresponding penalties.
Also, once the statutes are publicized, as such federal programs
often are, potential defendants and victims may be on actual notice
of this criminal behavior, providing local police departments with a
better ability to enforce them.
Conclusion
As an interesting postlude to the Sherrice Iverson murder,
although Nevada officials have been unable to charge David Cash
with a crime, federal officials are now investigating him in
connection with civil rights violations.236  In December 1998,
investigators began an inquiry into a racial slur Strohmeyer
allegedly made about his victim; consequently, some officials
believe Cash refused Sherrice Iverson assistance because of her
race.237 The exact charges being investigated are unknown.238
Perhaps motivated by widespread public discord, it now
appears that the federal government is attempting to do what the
courts and state legislatures have refused to - hold someone
accountable for failing to assist another. But this attempt to rectify
matters with an angry public runs directly counter to common law.
After all, if there is no duty to assist, what does it matter why
someone refuses to act within the law? Cash could have refused
assistance for any or no reason, if he had no duty to assist Sherrice.
If this attempt at a "reasonable" assessment of liability in
failure to assist cases is to succeed, it must have its impetus in the
legislature, and not in the judiciary. After all, following the Iverson
murder and Princess Diana's untimely death, public sentiment in
support of such liability has been higher than ever. The public
outrage surrounding Sherrice Iverson's untimely death should
provide legislatures with the impetus to do what the judiciary
cannot. Perhaps it has taken some vicious paparazzi and a drug
addicted teenage murderer to turn public sentiment away from the
"rosy-eyed" notion that "good people.. .generally aid victims when
they see them in trouble. '2 31 Or perhaps people nationwide are
simply not as upstanding as are Wisconsin residents. And maybe
236. See Associated Press, 2 Friends of Killer Testify In Casino Slaying, S. D.
UNION TRIB., Dec. 18, 1998, at A6.
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. See Daley, supra note 188, at 9.
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criminal sanctions would not have saved Sherrice Iverson, but
maybe they would have rendered David Cash responsible for
looking over that stall door and watching her die.
Marcia M. Ziegler
